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Abstract
According to the author’s narrative model of change, clients may maintain a problematic self-stability across therapy, leading
to therapeutic failure, by a mutual in-feeding process, which involves a cyclical movement between two opposing parts of the
self. During innovative moments (IMs) in the therapy dialogue, clients’ dominant self-narrative is interrupted by exceptions to
that self-narrative, but subsequently the dominant self-narrative returns. The authors identified return-to-the-problem markers
(RPMs), which are empirical indicators of the mutual in-feeding process, in passages containing IMs in 10 cases of narrative
therapy (five good-outcome cases and five poor-outcome cases) with females who were victims of intimate violence. The
poor-outcome group had a significantly higher percentage of IMs with RPMs than the good-outcome group. The results
suggest that therapeutic failures may reflect a systematic return to a dominant self-narrative after the emergence of novelties
(IMs).
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Why don’t people change? Each therapy model has an
account: ‘‘Resistance. Reactance. Noncompliance.
Unfinished business. Whatever you call it, we all
have had to deal with ambivalence to change in our
clients’’ (McCarthy & Barber, 2007, p. 504). This
article explores one possible path to therapeutic
failure: how problematic self-stability can be main-
tained, throughout therapy, by a mutual in-feeding
process (Valsiner, 2002), a cyclical movement
between two opposing parts of the self: the client’s
dominant self-narrative (usual way of understand-
ing the world) and innovative moments1 (IMs;
M. M. Gonc¸alves, Matos, & Santos, 2009; M. M.
Gonc¸alves, Santos, et al., 2010), which are mo-
ments in the therapeutic dialogue when clients
challenge their dominant self-narrative. We investi-
gated mutual in-feeding in 10 cases of narrative
therapy (five good-outcome cases and five poor-
outcome cases) with women who were victims of
intimate violence, previously analyzed with the
innovative moments coding system (IMCS; M. M.
Gonc¸alves, Ribeiro, Matos, Mendes, & Santos,
2010a; M. M. Gonc¸alves, Ribeiro, Matos, Mendes,
& Santos 2010b) by Matos, Santos, M. M.
Gonc¸alves, and Martins (2009).
Dominant Self-Narratives and IMs
Recent empirical studies of IMs’ development in
psychotherapy have led to a narrative model of
change, which suggests that change in psychother-
apy occurs through the emergence and amplification
of different types of IMs (M. M. Gonc¸alves,
Mendes, Ribeiro, Angus, & Greenberg, 2010; Matos
et al., 2009; Mendes, Ribeiro, Angus, Greenberg,
Sousa, & M. M. Gonc¸alves, in press; Ribeiro, M. M.
Gonc¸alves, & Santos, in press; Santos, M. M.
Gonc¸alves, Matos, & Salvatore, 2009; Santos,
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M. M. Gonc¸alves, & Matos, 2010). According to
this theory, a self-narrative may manifest itself as
implicit rules the person feels bound to follow or as
constraints on the way he or she experiences the
world (see White, 2007; White & Epston, 1990;
Zimmerman & Dickerson, 1994), insofar as a self-
narrative ‘‘not only governs which meanings are
attributed to events, but it also selects which events
are included and which are left out of the story’’
(Polkinghorne, 2004, p. 58). Therefore, a self-
narrative maintains the person’s way of understand-
ing the world, triggering repetition and fostering
stability and expectedness in dealing with the
uncertainty of the future (Josephs & Valsiner, 1998).
Hermans and Hermans-Jansen (1995) have sug-
gested that self-narratives result not from the activity
of an omniscient narrator (equated with the self) but
from a dialogical process of negotiation, tension,
disagreement, and alliance among different internal
positions or voices. Congruently, according to the
assimilation model (Honos-Webb & Stiles, 1998;
Stiles, 1999, 2002; Stiles et al., 1990), such internal
voices represent traces of individuals’ experiences or
ways of being in the world. The voice metaphor
underscores the traces’ agency; they can speak and
act. Constellations of similar or related experiences
become linked, or assimilated, and form a community
of voices. The community is experienced by the
individuals as their usual sense of self, personality,
or center of experience. The voice that is most often
speaking is normally a member of this dominant
community of voices and is sometimes called a
‘‘dominant voice.’’
We suggest that people become vulnerable to
distress and are likely to present for therapy if their
dominant community of voices is bound together by
a self-narrative that is too rigid and systematically
excludes significant experiences because they are not
congruent with it. From the community’s perspec-
tive, voices representing experiences that are dis-
crepant from how individuals typically perceive
themselves are problematic, and the community of
voices wards off, distorts, or actively avoids such
voices (Stiles, 1992, 2002; Stiles, Osatuke, Glick, &
Mackay, 2004). Although such avoidance can pre-
vent or reduce the distress in the short term, the
experiences remain unassimilated and unavailable as
resources, so from a clinician’s perspective, the
dominant self-narrative is problematic. In previous
work, we have often used the term problematic self-
narrative to refer to clients’ dominant self-narrative.
In this article, however, we prefer to characterize
these self-narratives by their role in binding the
community together rather than by their value from
an external perspective, although indeed the domi-
nant self-narratives we chose to study seemed
problematic from our perspective. Unassimilated
voices are not inert or devoid of agency. They
may be silenced and excluded, but circumstances
(including the therapeutic dialogue) may address
them, impelling them to move from the background
to the foreground (Hermans, 2006; Stiles et al.,
2004) and producing IMs. When they emerge
during IMs, such unassimilated voices challenge
the dominant self-narrative. Dialogically, then, IMs
are opportunities for unassimilated voices to emerge
and to tell their own stories, which differ from the
ones told by the dominant community.
The logic of IMs is illustrated by a recent study by
Osatuke and Stiles (2010; see also Osatuke et al.,
2007), which found a common dialogical pattern in
depressive clients: a conflict between an interperson-
ally submissive but intrapersonally dominant voice,
which organizes the majority of experiences (being
the dominant narrator), and an autonomous and
interpersonally assertive voice that is intrapersonally
suppressed by the community of voices that consti-
tutes the self. An IM would be considered as
occurring every time the assertive voice was some-
how heard, regardless of whether it emerged as a
thought, action, wish, or feeling. For the dominant
voice in such depressive cases, the process of
rejecting and silencing other voices maintains a
dominant self-narrative characterized by rigidity
and redundancy. Such dominant self-narratives
comprise strict rules, such as ‘‘always privilege the
wishes of others and ignore your own.’’ All voices
that suggest otherwise are excluded, suppressed, or
avoided, creating tension because they are not being
heard. Thus, for instance, when the person faces a
conflict with others and decides not to be assertive, a
tension is created because the nondominant (but
assertive) voices fight to be heard. Hearing from a
nondominant voice constitutes a novelty in the self-
system, which we call an IM. As a nondominant
voice is assimilated in the course of successful
therapy, it becomes more accessible and less dis-
sociated from the community of voices, and
the rigidity and redundancy of the dominant self-
narrative decrease.
Types of IMs and Associations with Outcome
The IMCS distinguishes five types of IMs that have
been observed in the therapeutic process: action,
reflection, protest, reconceptualization, and per-
forming change (M. M. Gonc¸alves, Ribeiro, et al.,
2010a, 2010b, in press; M. M. Gonc¸alves, Santos,
et al., 2010; M. M. Gonc¸alves, Mendes, et al., 2010;
Matos et al., 2009; Mendes et al., in press; Ribeiro
et al., in press; Santos et al., 2010).
28 M. M. Gonc¸alves et al.
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Action IMs are specific behaviors that challenge
the dominant self-narrative.
Reflection IMs are thoughts, feelings, intentions,
projects, or other cognitive products that chal-
lenge the dominant self-narrative.
Protest IMs entail new behaviors (like action
IMs) and/or thoughts (like reflection IMs) that
challenge the dominant self-narrative, repre-
senting a refusal of its assumptions. This active
refusal is the key feature that allows distin-
guishing protest from action and reflection.
Reconceptualization IMs are the most complex
type of innovations. The client not only
describes some form of contrast between pre-
sent and past (e.g., ‘‘Now I’ve changed X or
Y’’) but also understands the processes that
allowed this transformation.
Performing change IMs (previously labeled as
new experiences) are new aims, experiences,
activities, or projects, anticipated or in action,
as a consequence of change.
Examples of these IMs are shown in Table I. IMs
can be coded from transcripts and audio or video
recordings of sessions. While coding IMs, coders
must keep in mind the main features of the
dominant self-narrative*the constraining rules*
in order to identify the exceptions to those rules
(i.e., the IMs).
Studies of brief psychotherapy have shown that
poor- and good-outcome cases have different profiles
of IMs. Two relevant, replicated findings have been
observed in hypothesis-testing studies (Matos et al.,
2009; Mendes et al., in press) and case studies
(M. M. Gonc¸alves, Mendes, et al., 2010; Ribeiro et
al., in press; Santos et al., 2010). First, IMs appear
in both poor- and good-outcome cases, although in
good-outcome cases their salience2 (i.e., the time
devoted to the elaboration of IMs calculated as a
percentage of the session) is greater and tends to
increase as the treatment develops. Second, recon-
ceptualization and performing change IMs are sel-
dom observed in poor-outcome cases but represent a
substantial percentage of the IMs observed in good-
outcome cases. In good-outcome cases, reconcep-
tualization IMs tend to occur in the middle of the
therapeutic process and increase until the end.
Performing change IMs tend to occur after the
development of reconceptualization. Hence, poor-
and good-outcome cases tend to be similar at the
beginning of treatment, but in good-outcome cases
action, reflection, and protest IMs progress to
reconceptualization and performing change in the
middle and later parts of treatment.
IMs and Problematic Self-Stability: Mutual
In-Feeding
What processes block the path of successful psy-
chotherapy in poor-outcome cases? Why do poor-
outcome cases fail to follow the pattern of increasing
IM salience and the evolution from action, reflec-
tion, and protest IMs to reconceptualization and
performing change IMs in the middle and late
phases of therapy?
We argue, along with Hayes, Laurenceau, Feld-
man, Strauss, and Cardaciotto (2007), that ‘‘therapy
provides a stable environment and increases patients’
readiness and resources for change, but it also
introduces a variety of interventions to interrupt,
challenge, and destabilize’’ (p. 717). The emergence
and elaboration of IMs in the therapeutic conversa-
tion challenges and destabilizes a person’s usual way
of understanding and experiencing (the dominant
self-narrative), generating a sense of discrepancy or
inner contradiction (M. M. Gonc¸alves & Ribeiro, in
press; Ribeiro & M. M. Gonc¸alves, 2010). Congru-
ently, Engle and collaborators (Engle & Arkowitz,
2008; Engle & Holiman, 2002) have emphasized,
from a humanistic-experiential perspective, that
psychological changes introduce discrepancy or inner
contradiction. This discrepancy may be experienced
as a threat, evoking a self-protective response in
which the discrepant experience is ‘‘distorted, de-
nied, or inadequately symbolized,’’ keeping the client
safe from the anxiety produced by the change (Engle
& Arkowitz, 2008, p. 391). Hence, IMs represent a
window of opportunity for developing a new self-
narrative, but they may also create unpredictability
and uncontrollability (Arkowitz & Engle, 2007),
threatening clients’ sense of self-stability. Whether
IMs develop into a new self-narrative depends on the
way this threat is managed.
We have noticed that in poor-outcome cases
(Santos et al., 2010), as well as in initial and middle
phases of good-outcome cases (Ribeiro et al., in
press), clients tend to resolve the discrepancies or
inner contradictions that characterize IMs by making
a quick return to the dominant self-narrative. As
Swann (1987) suggested, self-discrepant informa-
tion (IMs) may prompt people to retrieve informa-
tion supporting the self-conception that is being
contradicted, thus promoting the return to the
dominant self-narrative.
The return to the dominant self-narrative sup-
presses the innovative way of feeling, thinking, or
acting, by bypassing, minimizing, depreciating, or
trivializing its meaning, and reinstates the dominant
self-narrative, promoting stability. Clients thereby
avoid the sense of discrepancy or inner contradiction.
As this sequence repeats, clients oscillate between
Mutual in-feeding and problematic self-narratives 29
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
 
B
y
:
 
[
M
g
o
n
c
a
l
v
e
s
]
 
A
t
:
 
1
1
:
2
9
 
1
6
 
F
e
b
r
u
a
r
y
 
2
0
1
1
elaboration of IMs, which temporarily disrupts the
dominant narrative, and the return to the dominant
self-narrative, reducing the discrepancy created by
the innovation. In this repetitive process, expressions
of the dominant self-narrative and IMs expressing an
alternative self-narrative act as opposite self-positions
in a negative feedback loop relation (Figure I).
Valsiner (2002) has called this process ‘‘mutual in-
feeding.’’
Mutual in-feeding is thus a form of stability within
the self, which may be understood as two opposing
parts of the self that keep feeding into each other,
Table I. Examples of Innovative Moments Vis-a`-Vis a Depressive Dominant Self-Narrative
IM type/content Example
Action
New coping behaviors facing anticipated or existent obstacles
Effective resolution of unsolved problem(s)
Active exploration of solutions
Restoring autonomy and self-control
Searching for information about the problem(s)
C: Yesterday, I went to the cinema for the first time in months!
Reflection: creating distance from the problem(s)
Comprehension*reconsidering causes of problem(s) and/or
awareness of effects
New problem(s) formulations
Adaptive self-instructions and thoughts
Intention to fight problem(s)’ demands, references of
self-worth, and/or feelings of well-being
C: I realize that what I was doing was just, not humanly possible
because I was pushing myself and I never allowed myself any free time,
uh, to myself . . . and it’s more natural and more healthy to let some of
these extra activities go.
Reflection: centered on the change
Therapeutic process: reflecting about the therapeutic process
Change process: considering the process and strategies;
implemented to overcome the problem(s); references of
self-worth and/or feelings of well-being (as consequences
of change)
New positions: references to new/emergent
identity versions in face of the problem(s)
C: I believe that our talks, our sessions, have proven fruitful, I felt like
going back a bit to old times, it was good, I felt good, I felt it was worth
it.
Protest: criticizing the problem(s)
Repositioning oneself toward the problem(s) C: What am I becoming after all? Is this where I’ll be getting to? Am I
going to stagnate here!?
Protest: emergence of new positions
Positions of assertiveness and empowerment C: I am an adult and I am responsible for my life, and, and, I want to
acknowledge these feelings and I’m going to let them out! I want to
experience life, I want to grow and it feels good to be in charge of my
own life.
Reconceptualization
Always involve two dimensions: (1) description of the
shift between two positions (past and present) and
(2) the process underlying this transformation
C: You know . . . when I was there at the museum, I thought to myself,
‘‘You really are different . . . A year ago you wouldn’t be able to go to
the supermarket!’’ Ever since I started going out, I started feeling less
depressed . . . it is also related to our conversations and changing jobs.
T: How did you have this idea of going to the museum?
C: I called my Dad and told him, ‘‘We’re going out today!’’
T: This is new, isn’t it?
C: Yes, it’s like I tell you . . . I sense that I’m different.
Performing change
Generalization into the future and other life dimensions of
good outcomes
Problematic experience as a resource to new situations
Investment in new projects as a result of the process of change
Investment in new relationships as a result of the process of
change
Performance of change: new skills
Reemergence of neglected or forgotten self-versions
T: You seem to have so many projects for the future now!
C: Yes, you’re right. I want to do all the things that were impossible for
me to do while I was dominated by depression. I want to work again
and to have the time to enjoy my life with my children. I want to have
friends again. The loss of all the friendships of the past is something
that still hurts me really deeply. I want to have friends again, to have
people to talk to, to share experiences and to feel the complicity in my
life again.
30 M. M. Gonc¸alves et al.
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expressing themselves alternately. From a dialogical
point of view (Valsiner, 2002; see also Hermans,
1996), the client performs a cyclical movement
between a voice (dominant self-narrative) and a
countervoice (alternative self-narrative) that inter-
feres with the development of an inclusive system of
meanings in therapy in which these internal voices
respectfully listen to each other and engage in joint
action.
As an illustration, imagine that one of the sub-
missive, depressed clients studied by Osatuke and
Stiles (2010) said, ‘‘Sometimes I say to myself:
I won’t do X [something requested explicitly or
implicitly by others].’’ This assertive expression
would constitute an IM, because it is a challenge of
the dominant self-narrative. This innovative voice
might be neutralized if a dominant voice emerged
and said something like ‘‘But then I feel I’m being an
egotistical person in not doing X.’’ If this dominant
voice forces again the nondominant (innovative)
voice to the background and silences it, neutraliza-
tion of the novelty has occurred (Figure II).
Mutual in-feeding may lead to an ‘‘impasse or a
state of ‘stuckness’’’ (Honos-Webb & Stiles, 1998,
p. 28; cf. Perls, 1969); however, this may be over-
come by the development of relationships between
the two opposing voices as they build meaning
bridges (Brinegar, Salvi, Stiles, & Greenberg, 2006;
Osatuke et al., 2004; cf. Rice & Saperia, 1984).
A meaning bridge is a sign or system of signs (e.g.,
word, phrase, gesture, or narrative) that has the same
meaning to the author and addressee (e.g., an
unassimilated voice and the community of voices).
Meaning bridges enable voices to communicate
about shared experiences and form links to each
other. By building meaning bridges, previously
avoided experiences may become accessible to the
community as resources following a developmental
progression described in the assimilation of proble-
matic experiences sequence (APES; Stiles, 2002;
Stiles et al., 1990).
Mutual in-feeding is congruent with a variety of
other formulations of clients’ resistance to psy-
chotherapeutic change (Arkowitz & Engle, 2007;
Feixas, Sa´nchez, & Go´mez-Jarabo, 2002). With
Arkowitz and Engle (2007), we understand resis-
tance as ambivalence. Within a multivoiced under-
standing of the self, clients who are ambivalent
possess an internal voice that moves toward change
and another internal voice that struggles against
change. Congruent with this formulation, the assim-
ilation model’s concept of ‘‘rapid cross-fire’’ refers to
opposing expressions by two contradictory internal
voices (Brinegar et al., 2006); each voice triggers
contradiction by the other, so they seem ‘‘to fight for
possession of the floor’’ (Brinegar et al., 2006,
p. 170). A similar formulation is constructivist
therapy’s concept of ‘‘slot rattling’’ (Kelly, 1955),
in which clients construe experiences on the opposite
pole of an existing construct. For example, a
pessimistic person might act as if he or she was an
optimistic person. If pursued, this could lead to
beneficial elaboration of the person’s construct
system, enabling further development. More often,
however, slot rattling is only superficial movement,
with the client reverting to the original pessimism
when he or she encounters difficulties or invalida-
tion. In each of these characterizations of conflicting
internal self-positions, the dialogue maintains the
person’s status quo. They seem to reflect efforts to
protect self-identity, sense of integrity, or coherence
(Ecker & Hulley, 2000; Feixas et al., 2002;
Fernandes, Senra, & Feixas, 2010; Kelly, 1955;
Mahoney, 1991).
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Figure I. Mutual in-feeding throughout the therapeutic process.
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The Return-to-the-Problem Marker
We propose a measure of the mutual in-feeding
process that grew from our observations of therapy
passages in which an IM emerged and was
immediately followed by a return to the dominant
self-narrative. We call such an event a ‘‘return-
to-the-problem’’ marker (RPM). Take, for example,
the following:
I don’t want to be depressed anymore. [Reflection
IM]
But I just can’t. [RPM]
In this example, the IM ‘‘I don’t want to be depressed
anymore’’ was followed by a return to the dominant
self-narrative, ‘‘but I can’t.’’ This clause introduced
by the word but represents opposition or negation
toward what is being said and constitutes the RPM.
Goals and Hypotheses
Our goal was to shed light on problematic self-
stability. We sought to assess whether clients’
responding to IMs by returning to the dominant
self-narrative (i.e., responding with RPMs) contri-
butes to maintaining the dominant self-narrative.
We expected that in poor-outcome cases the
potential for IMs to create narrative diversity would
be prevented by the rapid return to the dominant
self-narrative (Santos & M. M. Gonc¸alves, 2009;
Santos et al., 2010). In good-outcome cases, on the
other hand, IMs should be elaborated, with relatively
fewer RPMs, at least in the later stages of therapy
(Ribeiro et al., in press). Further, reconceptualiza-
tion IMs and performing change IMs, which tend to
occur in the late stages of good-outcome cases, seem
less likely than other IMs to support RPMs. Re-
conceptualization ‘‘requires a meta-level reflexivity
that allows the person to become aware of a
transformation process’’ (Cunha, M. M. Gonc¸alves,
Valsiner, Mendes, & Ribeiro, in press). Performing
change involves generalization of the change process
into several life domains, which seems incompatible
with mutual in-feeding. Thus, this reasoning too
suggests that mutual in-feeding should occur rela-
tively less frequently in these two types of IMs.
We examined three hypotheses in this study: (1)
Poor-outcome cases present a higher percentage of
IMs with RPMs; (2) the percentage of IMs with
RPMs decreases throughout therapy in good-
outcome cases but not in poor-outcome cases; and
(3) action, reflection, and protest IMs present more
But then I feel I’m being an egotistical person in 
not doing X.  
(Return to the dominant self-narrative) 
Sometimes I say to myself: I won’t do X 
(something requested explicitly or implicitly 
by others) 
 (Protest IM)
I’ve been submissive all my life! It’s
just the way I am! 
(Dominant self-narrative) 
I’m usually very submissive 
(Dominant self-narrative) 
Figure II. Avoiding self-discrepancy by returning to the dominant self-narrative.
32 M. M. Gonc¸alves et al.
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RPMs than reconceptualization and performing
change IMs.
Method
Data for the current study were drawn from the
Matos et al. (2009) study of IMs in narrative therapy.
Relevant parts of that study’s method*namely cli-
ents, therapist and therapy, measures, IM coding and
reliability, and contrasting groups’ constitution*are
summarized here; please see Matos et al. (2009) for
full details.
Clients
The client sample comprised 10 women with current
experience of multidimensional intimate violence.
They provided written consent after being informed
of the research objectives and procedures. Clients
ranged in age from 22 to 57 years. Four had no
children and the remaining six had one to four
children. Level of education varied from basic to
postgraduate education, and occupations varied
from rather unskilled to highly skilled. Seven clients
were married, one was cohabitating with the partner,
and the other two were dating (without cohabita-
tion). By the end of psychotherapy, four clients had
ended the relationship.
The abusive relationships in which these women
were involved had lasted from 1 to 20 years. Four
women were victimized for a long period of time
( 5 years), and for six the violence experience was
briefer (B 5 years). Psychological violence was
present in all the cases. Five clients were victims
of both physical and sexual aggression.
Therapist and Therapy
Clients attended psychotherapy in a Portuguese
university clinic, where they were seen in individual
narrative therapy (White & Epston, 1990). All
clients were treated by the same female therapist,
who at the time had a master’s degree in psychology
and 5 years of experience in psychotherapy with
battered women. Psychotherapy was supervised to
ensure therapist adherence to the narrative therapy
model.
The therapy was developed from the narrative
model of White and Epston (1990); see also White,
2007) and involved (1) externalization of problems;
(2) identification of the cultural and social assump-
tions that support women’s abuse; (3) identification
of unique outcomes (or, as we prefer, IMs); (4)
therapeutic questioning around these unique out-
comes, trying to create a new, alternative narrative to
the one that was externalized; and (5) consolidation
of the changes through social validation, trying to
make more visible the way change happened (see
Matos et al., 2009, for a detailed description of the
narrative therapy guidelines).
Measures
Brief Symptom Inventory (BSI; Derogatis &
Melisaratos, 1983). The BSI is a 53-item self-
report measurement of distress, with items rated on
a 5-point Likert scale. Derogatis reported internal
consistency estimates of a.89 and testretest
reliability of .90 for the GSI. We used the Portu-
guese adaptation by Canavarro (2007), which
presents good psychometric characteristics (Cron-
bach’s a for the nine symptom subscales ranges
from .62.80).
Severity of Victimization Rating Scale
(SVRS). SVRS assesses abusive actions received
(physical, psychological, and/or sexual), their fre-
quency, and severity on a 3-point scale (low,
medium, high); it is completed by the therapist
based on the client’s report.
Scale of beliefs about partner violence
(Escala de Crenc¸as Sobre Violeˆncia Conjugal
[ECVC]; Matos, Machado, & M. M. Gonc¸alves,
2000). The self-report ECVC evaluates clients’
beliefs regarding partner violence. It contains 25
items, which are rated using a 5-point Likert scale.
This scale has good reliability (Cronbach’s a.9;
C. Machado, Matos, & M. M. Gonc¸alves, 2004).
Working Alliance Inventory (WAI; Horvath,
1982). This questionnaire assesses therapeutic alli-
ance quality. It contains 36 items, which are rated on a
7-point Likert scale. The Portuguese version (P. P.
Machado & Horvath, 1999) presents good validity
and reliability indicators (Cronbach’s a.95).
Procedure
Outcome and alliance measures admini-
stration. BSI was administrated in Sessions
1,4,8,12, and 16 and at 6-month follow-up. This
study used the Global Severity Index (GSI) of the
BSI, which considers responses to all items, because
this is considered to be the best single predictor of
level of distress (Derogatis, 1993). Like the BSI,
SVRS was recorded every fourth session, starting
with the first. EVCS was administrated in sessions
1 and 16 and at 6-month follow-up. WAI was
administered in Sessions 4, 8, 12, and 16 and at
6-month follow-up; versions for client and observers
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(two independent observers coded recordings of
sessions) were applied.
IM coding and reliability. IM coding was based
on the IMCS (M. M. Gonc¸alves, Ribeiro et al.,
2010a, 2010b) (Table I). First, each of three judges
read the clinical files and watched the video record-
ings of each client’s sessions in their entirety. The
judges then independently listed the client’s pro-
blems (themes from the dominant self-narrative that
brought the client to therapy) and met to discuss
their comprehension of the client’s dominant self-
narrative. Following this, the client’s dominant self-
narrative was consensually characterized in a way
that remained faithful to the client’s words. This
procedure set the stage for the identification of IMs,
insofar as they include every moment in which the
client engaged in actions, thoughts, or emotions that
were novel or different from the identified dominant
self-narrative.
Next, the judges coded the IMs by viewing each
session in video and noting the type and the salience
of each IM as it appeared in the session. Salience was
assessed by measuring the beginning and the end of
each IM to the nearest second. The sessions were
coded in the order they occurred. Session recordings
were coded by trained judges: Judge A (Anita
Santos, who was unaware of the outcomes) coded
all the sessions; and Judge B (a team comprising
Marlene Matos and another volunteer judge) coded
only the sessions in which the outcome assessment
instruments were applied (Sessions 1, 4, 8, 12, and
16 and 6-month follow-up).
Reliability indexes were computed on these ses-
sions (30% of the entire sample). Interjudge agree-
ment on overall salience was calculated as the time
identified by both judges divided by the time
identified by either judge. The percentage of agree-
ment on overall IMs salience was 86%. Reliability of
distinguishing IM types, assessed by Cohen’s k, was
.89 (based on a sample size of 547 IMs). Because of
the high interjudge reliability, Matos et al. (2009)
based their analyses on Judge A’s coding. The results
of applying the IMCS were reported previously by
Matos et al. (2009) and were preliminary to this
study’s application of the RPM coding system.
RPM coding and reliability. Two judges parti-
cipated in the RPM coding procedure (Anto´nio P.
Ribeiro and Tatiana Conde). At the time of coding,
both were unaware of the outcome status of the
cases.
Training for RPM coding began with reading the
Manual for the Return to the Problem Coding System
(M. M. Gonc¸alves, Ribeiro, Santos, J. Gonc¸alves, &
Conde, 2009), along with theoretical papers and
research reports that described relevant assumptions
and major empirical findings. Next, the two judges
coded RPMs in a workbook that included transcripts
of all IMs from one psychotherapy case. This step was
followed by a discussion of discrepancies with a group
of other RPM judges in training and/or with a skilled
RPM judge present. After this discussion, they coded
a second workbook that included transcripts of all
IMs from another psychotherapy case. Their codes
were then compared with the codes of expert judges.
New judges were required to achieve a Cohen’s k
higher than .75 before proceeding (both judges did).
As described in the RPCS manual (M. M.
Gonc¸alves, Ribeiro, et al., 2009), RPMs are coded
only when the dominant self-narrative is reasserted
immediately after the IM, that is, within the same
speaking turn or within the client’s first speaking
turn that follows the therapist’s first intervention
after the IM description (see the Appendix for an
explanation of exceptions to these criteria), as in
the following example:
Maybe I’ll get what I want after all, I don’t know
[IM] . . . but I feel weak, psychologically speaking
. . . as if me or someone inside me was incessantly
saying ‘You cannot, you will not be able to do it.’
That’s how I feel*weak, invariably sad, not
thinking much of myself. [RPM]
RPMs coding comprised two sequential steps: (1)
independent coding and (2) resolving disagreements
through consensus. The judges independently coded
the entire sample (126 sessions), analysing IMs
coded by Matos et al. (2009) for the presence of
RPMs, following the RPCS manual. The sessions
were coded from video recording in the order they
occurred. Reliability of identifying RPMs, assessed
by Cohen’s k, was .93, based on the initial indepen-
dent coding of a sample size of 1,596 IMs.
Throughout the coding process, the two judges
met after coding each session and noted differences
in their perspectives of the problems and in their
RPM coding. When differences were detected, they
were resolved through consensual discussion. During
the collaborative meetings, the judges discussed the
strengths of each other’s coding and the criteria used
to achieve them. Through this interactive procedure,
the judges were able to integrate each other’s
strengths, which facilitated the coding of subsequent
sessions (cf. Brinegar et al., 2006). Because we
privileged false-negative over false-positive results,
IMs on which the investigators could not reach an
34 M. M. Gonc¸alves et al.
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agreement were eliminated (Krause et al., 2007).
The analysis was then based on the consensus
between the two judges.
Contrasting Groups’ Constitution
We used contrasting groups constructed by Matos
et al. (2009), who distinguished a good-outcome
group (n5) and a poor-outcome group (n5)
based on two criteria. A good-outcome occurred
when (1) there was an evolution toward a no-
relevant-symptom condition, as assessed by BSI,
from the beginning to the end of therapy (based on
a GSI cutoff score of 5 1.32; Matos, 2006) and (2)
simultaneously victimization by the partner ended or
showed a very significant change from the beginning
to the end of therapy, according to the client’s report.
Meeting this criterion required a significant change in
victimization pattern, although the client might still
experience relatively minor forms of violence (e.g.,
insulting, shouting) as well as a modification of
episode frequency from continuous to occasional.
Good- and poor-outcome group demogra-
phics and alliance. Matos et al. (2009) reported
no significant differences between the good- and
poor-outcome groups in age, education level, rela-
tionship duration, victimization duration, initial
scores on the GSI (symptoms) or the attitudes
toward partner violence, as assessed by the ECVC.
WAI results showed that the therapeutic alliance was
high in both groups and in all the sessions evaluated,
with a nominally significant difference in the per-
spective of one of the observers, according to whom
the therapeutic alliance was better in the good-
outcome group at Session 4. There were no sig-
nificant WAI differences in the perspective of the
other observer, the clients, or the therapist.
IMs in good- and poor-outcome groups.
Matos et al. (2009) reported that reconceptualiza-
tion and performing change IMs were very rare in
poor-outcome cases, and their salience was very low.
The global salience of IMs was higher in the good-
outcome group; this disparity was entirely attribu-
table to the differences in reconceptualization and
performing change IMs. In the majority of good-
outcome cases, reconceptualization and performing
change IMs emerged in the middle of the therapy
and increased through the final phase, whereas they
were almost absent throughout therapy in the poor-
outcome cases.
Results
RPMs in Good- and Poor-Outcome Groups:
Analytic Strategy
We used parametric tests (t test for Hypothesis 1 and
two-way mixed analyses of variance [ANOVAs] for
Hypotheses 2 and 3).We confirmed that our conclu-
sions would not change when applying nonpara-
metric tests, as proposed by Fife-Schaw (2006).
Significance levels were set at a.05. In the
ANOVA, GreenhouseGeisser o-corrected p values
were reported to correct for violations of the
sphericity assumption. According to Cohen (1988,
1992), effect sizes f were computed for ANOVA
effects and effect sizes d for t-test mean differences.
The number of sessions varied from 12 to 16 in
the good-outcome group (M14.60, SD1.67)
and from six to 16 in the poor-outcome group
(M10.60, SD4.34; see Table II), but the mean
number of sessions was not significantly different,
t(8)1.93, p.09. Likewise, we found no differ-
ences in the frequency of IMs per session between
the good-outcome (M14.53, SD4.76) and the
poor-outcome (M10.58, SD3.38) groups,
t(8)1.51, p.17. Therefore, there was no need
to use the number of coded sessions as a covariate.
Hypothesis 1: The Emergence of RPMs in
Good- and Poor-Outcome Groups
Consistent with our hypothesis, RPMs were less
frequent in the good-outcome group (M16.20,
SD4.82) than in the poor-outcome group (M
42.00, SD21.76), a statistically significant differ-
ence, t(8)2.59, p.03, effect size d1.64.
Because the number of IMs varied substantially
across cases, we also computed the percentage of
IMs with RPMs (frequency of IMs with RPMs/total
frequency of IMs100). The poor-outcome group
(M38.94, SD13.15) had a significantly higher
percentage of IMs with RPMs than did the good-
outcome group (M7.84, SD1.51), t(8)5.25,
p.001, d3.32.
Table II. Number of Sessions in Good- and Poor-Outcome
Groups
Good-outcome group Poor-outcome group
Case No. sessions Case No. sessions
1 14 6 10
2 15 7 6
3 12 8 7
4 16 9 16
5 16 10 14
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Hypothesis 2: The Evolution of RPMs in Good-
and Poor-Outcome Groups
Contrary to our hypothesis, the percentage of IMs
with RPMs did not change from the first to the last
session. The poor-outcome group had a higher
percentage of IMs with RPMs than did the good-
outcome group in both their first (Mgood11.36,
SD7.34; Mpoor47.03, SD35.47) and last
(Mgood4.32, SD4.04; Mpoor40.85, SD
20.45) sessions. In a two-way mixed ANOVA with
group as the between-subjects factor and session as
the within-subject factor, the main effect of group
was significant, F(1, 8)9.82, p.01, effect size
f1.11; however, the main effect of session was not,
F(1, 8)1.04, p.34, f.11, nor was the Session
Group interaction, F(1, 8).00, p.95, f.03.
Hypothesis 3: The Occurrence of RPMs in
Different Types of IMs
The five types of IMs showed greatly different
likelihood of including RPMs in a pattern that
partially supported Hypothesis 3 (Table III).
A two-way mixed ANOVA with group as the
between-subjects factor and the type of IM as the
within-subject factor found a significant main effect
of type of IM, F(2.19, 17.54)19.22, p.000,
f1.55. Pairwise comparisons revealed that RPMs
were less likely in reconceptualization than in
reflection and protest IMs and less likely in
performing change than in reflection, protest, and
reconceptualization IMs. Consistent with Hypoth-
esis 3, the likelihood of RPMs in reconceptualiza-
tion and performing change IMs was significantly
lower than in reflection or in protest IMs. Con-
trary to Hypothesis 3, however, the likelihood of
RPMs in action IMs was not significantly different
than in reconceptualization or in performing
change IMs.
As Table III shows, the profile of likelihoods was
similar in the good- and poor-outcome groups. The
main effect of group was not significant, F(1, 8) 
0.00, p1, f.00, nor was the Type of IMGroup
interaction, F(2.19, 17.54)0.75, p.50, f.31.
Discussion
In accord with our first hypothesis, IMs were much
more likely to be followed by a return to the
dominant narrative in the five poor-outcome cases
than in the five good-outcome cases. Even though
the groups had similar levels of symptom severity at
intake, they showed dramatically different percen-
tages of IMs containing RPMs. This observation is
consistent with the theoretical suggestion that mu-
tual in-feeding between the dominant self-narrative
and IMs can interfere with therapeutic progress or at
least mark the lack of progress (M. M. Gonc¸alves,
Matos et al., 2009).
Contrary to our second hypothesis, that the
different likelihood of RPMs would occur only later
in therapy, the lower likelihood of RPMs in the
good-outcome group was apparent in the first as well
as the last session. Perhaps clients in these groups,
despite their similar levels of symptom severity,
entered therapy at different stages of change. Stage
models of psychological change suggest that certain
tasks have to be accomplished before others can
be undertaken. Two prominent examples of such
models are the assimilation model (Honos-Webb &
Stiles, 1998; Stiles, 2002; Stiles et al., 1990) and the
transtheoretical model of behavior change (TTM;
Napper et al., 2008; Prochaska & DiClemente,
1982; Prochaska & Norcross, 2001). According to
the assimilation model, clients’ incremental assim-
ilation of their problematic experiences proceeds in
eight stages (Stiles, 2002), from complete dissocia-
tion to smooth integration of the formerly nondo-
minant (problematic) voices into the self. According
to the TTM, change proceeds through five stages:
precontemplation, contemplation, preparation,
action, and maintenance. Studies framed within
each of these models have suggested that clients
entering therapy at earlier stages are less likely to
have successful outcomes than those entering at later
stages (Emmerling & Whelton, 2009; Honos-Webb,
Stiles, Greenberg, & Goldman, 1998; Stiles, 2006).
Perhaps clients in this study’s poor-outcome group
entered therapy at lower stages of the change process
(e.g., precontemplation in the TTM sequence or
unwanted thoughts/avoidance in the assimilation
sequence), whereas those in good-outcome cases
entered therapy at higher stages. Alternatively,
perhaps clients from the good-outcome group en-
tered treatment with more psychological and social
resources or were more involved in therapy
(although there were no significant between-group
differences in age, education level, relationship
Table III. Percentage (Mean9Standard Deviation) of Return-to-
the-Problem Markers in Different Types of Innovative Moments
(IMs)
IM
Good-outcome
group (n5)
Poor-outcome
group (n5)
Action 16.76 (18.97) 11.28 (11.02)
Reflection 44.09 (14.00) 45.30 (13.97)
Protest 25.16 (7.59) 35.07 (13.85)
Reconceptualization 12.74 (4.31) 5.45 (7.67)
Performing change 1.25 (2.80) 2.90 (5.44)
36 M. M. Gonc¸alves et al.
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duration, victimization duration, or initial scores on
symptomatology as assessed by the BSI or the
attitudes toward partner violence, as assessed by
the ECVC). Unfortunately, we have no data that
allow us to distinguish conclusively among these
possibilities.
Finding a lower incidence of RPMs in reconcep-
tualization and performing change IMs than in
reflection and protest IMs is congruent with theore-
tical assumptions (see M. M. Gonc¸alves, Matos
et al., 2009), corroborating reconceptualization and
performing change as markers of sustained thera-
peutic change (Hypothesis 3). Action IMs were
intermediate: less likely to contain RPMs than
reflection and protest and more likely to contain
RPMs than reconceptualization and performing
change. Action IMs are overt and tend to be more
visible to the client and others than protest and
reflection IMs. Perhaps they are experienced as ‘‘real
proofs that I am changing’’ and consequently less
vulnerable to mutual in-feeding.
Several limitations should be noted. Confidence in
the generality of our findings about psychotherapeu-
tic failure is limited by the small size of our sample
and its restriction to victims of intimate violence.
Application of our new method for coding RPMs to
other samples may clarify whether RPMs are also
associated with unsuccessful psychotherapy of other
types and in other groups.
Practitioners are likely to encounter the mutual in-
feeding process at some point in their clinical
practice, and RPMs might offer information useful
for identifying and addressing unproductive stagna-
tion of the therapeutic process (Santos et al., 2010).
Understanding RPMs may help therapists deal with
ambivalence in therapy. Identifying these processes
opens the option to act upon them, inviting clients to
position themselves in new ways and resolving
therapeutic impasses.
We did not assess clients’ stage of change (e.g.,
according to the APES or the TTM), so we could not
assess whether this accounted for the group differ-
ences in RPMs at the beginning of treatment. In
future studies, evaluating clients’ stage of change at
the beginning of therapy would contribute to under-
standing this possibility. When therapists try to
stimulate or amplify IMs in ways that do not match
clients’ stage of change, they may unintentionally
contribute to the oscillatory cycle between the IMs
and the problem (Santos et al., 2010). For example, if
therapists respond to clients’ return to the dominant
self-narrative by trying to convince them that they are
changing, clients may feel misunderstood, invoking a
‘‘strong reactance on the part of the client, often
hardening the client’s stuck position’’ (Engle &
Arkowitz, 2008, p. 390). Engle and Arkowitz sug-
gested that ‘‘therapists need to monitor their frustra-
tion, resist the temptation to ‘help’ the client by
pushing for change, and to direct his or her efforts
toward an understanding of what it is in the client’s
experience that prevents easy change’’ (p. 391).
RPMs may not always represent therapeutic stag-
nation. In studies of two good-outcome cases, Brine-
gar et al. (2006) identified the rapid cross-fire
phenomenon: an alternation of opposing expressions
that appears to qualify as an RPM. They identified
rapid cross-fire as a substage in the successful assim-
ilation of specific problematic experiences in those
cases, although importantly it occurred in only a few
sessions during themiddle of treatment, in contrast to
its continued presence throughout treatment in our
poor-outcome cases.Nevertheless, the possibility that
RPMs may sometimes signal or contribute to ther-
apeutic movement deserves further study.
Mutual in-feeding is an interpersonal process and
needs to be understood in the interpersonal context
in which it occurs: the intersubjective field created
in all interactions between the therapist and the
client (Engle & Arkowitz, 2008). According to
Engle and Arkowitz, ‘‘Therapists can facilitate the
resolution of resistant ambivalence by creating in-
session exercises that increase awareness and inte-
gration of disowned aspects of the self ’’ (p. 393), in
the context of a safe and accepting relationship.
Focused theory-building case studies (Stiles, 2009)
could yield a deeper understanding of how thera-
pists contribute to maintaining or overcoming
mutual in-feeding.
Appendix: Some Subtleties of RPM Coding
Normally, an RPM is coded only if the return takes
place within the same speaking turn or in the client’s
first speaking turn that follows the therapist’s first
intervention after the IM. However, two sorts of
therapist response are not considered as interven-
tions for this purpose:
Minimal Encouragers
We do not consider minimal encouragers, such
as minimal verbal utterances (e.g., ‘‘Umm’’ and
‘‘Uh-huh’’), or repetition of key words and direct
restatement as the therapist’s first interventions, as in
the following example:
Client: Lately, perhaps since I moved . . . about 2
weeks ago, I’ve been feeling better. [IM]
Therapist: Uh-huh. [Minimal encourager; not to
be considered as the first therapist intervention]
Client: I moved because my apartment was too
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expensive . . . this new one is cheaper and it’s
closer to my job.
Therapist: So you’ve been feeling better, is that
right? [Should be considered as the therapist’s first
intervention after IM description]
Client: Not really, I keep crying all the time!
[Client’s first speaking turn after therapist’s first
intervention, representing an RPM]
By the same token, we do not consider the client’s
minimal verbal utterances (e.g., ‘‘Umm’’ and ‘‘Uh-
huh’’) as the first speaking turn after the therapist
first intervention, as in the following example:
Client: Lately, perhaps since I moved . . . about 2
weeks ago, I’ve been feeling better. [IM]
Therapist: I have been noticing that you are
different. [Therapist’s first intervention]
Client: Uh-huh. [Minimal encourager; not to be
considered as client’s first speaking turn after
therapist’s first intervention]
Therapist: You seem more active, happier.
Client: Although I seem happier, I don’t I feel
happier! Although I don’t cry as much as I used to,
the problems don’t seem to set apart! [Should be
considered as client’s first speaking turn after
therapist’s first intervention, representing an RPM]
Therapist’s Intervention Not Centred on IM
Content
We only consider the client’s first speaking turn that
follows the therapist’s first intervention after the IM
description, when this intervention is centred on the
IM’s content.Hence,wedonot consider anRPMwhen
the therapist intervention clearly invites the client to
speak about the problem, as in the following example:
Client: Although I still find it hard to get going in
the mornings, I kind of don’t try to sweep away
things that much anymore, that’s I guess one
major change. [IM]
Therapist: You said it’s hard to get going. Is the
sadness more intense in the mornings? [Thera-
pist’s question clearly invites client to speak about
the problem]
Client: Yes, indeed. [Client’s first speaking turn
that follows the therapist’s first intervention after
IM description; should not be coded as an RPM]
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Notes
1 The concept of IMs is a methodological realization of the
concept of unique outcome proposed by White and Epston
(1990). See M. M. Gonc¸alves, Matos et al. (2009) for a
discussion of this topic.
2 Instead of using frequency as a measure of the IMs, we prefer to
use salience, because frequency is simply the emergence of a
given IM, giving no information about how long therapists and
clients were talking about it. Therefore, we consider that
salience is a more direct indicator of narrative elaboration.
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